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MARKET INTEGRATION AND (THE LIMITS OF)
THE FIRST SALE RULE IN NORTH AMERICAN
AND EUROPEAN TRADEMARK LAW
Irene Calboli*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The relationship between exclusive trademark rights and
the free movement of goods across international borders has
historically represented one of the most heated topics of
discussion in the international trademark debate.1 In a
previous work published a few years ago, I analyzed this topic
in the context of European trademark law and the case law of
the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ).2 In this
* Associate Professor of Law and Director, Intellectual Property and
Technology Program, Marquette University Law School; Spring 2011 CIPLIT
Visiting Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. I would like to
thank Eric Goldman for the invitation to speak at the ―Exhaustion and First
Sale in Intellectual Property‖ conference held at Santa Clara University School
of Law on November 5, 2010, and for his insightful suggestions during the
research and writing of this Article. I also thank the conference participants
and my colleagues Michael O‘Hear and Josh Sarnoff for useful conversation and
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Finally, I thank Marquette
University Law School for research support, Jeremy Hager for research
assistance, and the editors of the Santa Clara Law Review, and in particular
Mike Foy, Lara Muller, and Farid Zakaria, for their assistance during the
editing process of this Article.
1. The literature on this topic is extensive. See, e.g., TIMOTHY H. HIEBERT,
PARALLEL IMPORTATION IN U.S. TRADEMARK LAW 1 (1994); Friedrich-Karl
Beier, Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade, 1 I.I.C. 48
(1970); Christopher Heath, Parallel Imports and International Trade, 28 I.I.C.
623 (1997); John C. Hilke, Free Trading or Free-Riding: An Examination of the
Theories and Available Empirical Evidence on Gray Market Imports, 31 WORLD
COMPETITION L & ECON. REV. 75 (1988); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Prohibition
of Parallel Imports Through Intellectual Property Rights, 30 I.I.C. 495 (1999);
E.C. Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genuinely Marked Goods is
not a Trademark Problem, 49 TRADEMARK REP. 707 (1959); Charles Worth, Free
Trade Agreements and the Exhaustion of Rights Principle, 1 E.I.P.R. 40 (1994).
2. See Irene Calboli, Trademark Exhaustion in the European Union:
Community-Wide or International? The Saga Continues, 6 MARQ. INTELL.
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Article I advance this analysis in a larger context: the tension
between the national exercise of trademark rights and the
free movement of goods within free trade areas (regional
trade agreements among sovereign countries) in general, with
particular attention to the issues related to differences in
product quality. Notably, in this Article I explore the
effectiveness, and the limitations, of the principle of
―trademark first sale‖ in promoting the free movement of
goods in free trade areas. To this end, I compare the
application of this principle and the resulting market
integration achieved by two of the most prominent free trade
areas in the current international context: the North
American countries with the adoption of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the members of the
European Union (EU). Based upon this comparison, I provide
some specific suggestions and policy considerations as to the
possible approaches that members of existing and future free
trade areas can follow to promote and guarantee effective
market integration and free movement of goods in their
respective territory.3
The principle of ―trademark first sale,‖ which is also
known as ―trademark exhaustion,‖4 represents a milestone in
PROP. L. REV. 47 (2002) (providing a detailed analysis of the development of the
principle of trademark exhaustion under European trademark law).
3. Because of the complexity of this topic and the limited scope of this
Article, this Article focuses on the analysis of the principle of trademark first
sale, or trademark exhaustion, only within trademark law and policy. This
Article does not address other relevant issues related to the relationship
between the free movement of goods and international trade in general, nor
elaborate on the economic aspects, positive and negative, of parallel imports for
corporations and national economies. Likewise, this Article does not address
the frequent antitrust issues that can arise as a result of the monopolistic
exercise of trademark rights with respect to gray market goods nor other means
to control product distribution, such as licensing clauses, contracts, or torts.
This Article also does not extensively elaborate on the differences between the
theories of ―universality‖ and ―territoriality‖ of trademark protection and the
preference for a system of ―trademark territoriality‖ that has characterized the
harmonization of trademark laws among members of the International
Community. Finally, this Article does not explore the effect of the Internet and
e-commerce on the traditional territorial interpretation of the principle of
trademark exhaustion.
4. See FREDERICK M. ABBOT, THOMAS COTTIER & FRANCIS GURRY,
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN AN INTEGRATED WORLD ECONOMY
270 (2007). This Article uses the terms ―trademark first sale,‖ ―trademark
exhaustion,‖ and ―exhaustion of trademark rights‖ interchangeably as
synonyms.

CALBOLI_FINAL

2011]

5/31/2011 5:53 PM

MARKET INTEGRATION AND FIRST SALE

1243

trademark theory. Trademark law grants trademark owners
the right to prevent third parties from using identical or
similar signs to identify confusingly similar products in the
market.5
Nevertheless, once a trademark owner has
introduced into the market a product, or a batch of products,
these rights are considered ―exhausted‖ with respect to those
products, and the trademark owner can no longer rely on
trademark rights to control the products‘ future circulation.6
This principle was developed by the courts in the nineteenth
century to balance the rights of trademark owners to prevent
the inappropriate use of their marks with the rights of
retailers, second-hand dealers, and consumers to freely
display, advertise, and resell the products that they lawfully
purchased in the market, even if those actions directly
compete with the trademark owners‘ business activities in the
same market.7 Since then, courts have invariably repeated
and confirmed this principle, which has also been
incorporated in most national trademark legislations.8
Traditionally, there has been little dispute about the
application of the principle of trademark first sale within
national markets—once distributed for sale in a national
market, products are generally free to move within the
domestic territory despite trademark owners‘ desires to
control future product distribution in that market.9 In
contrast, fierce disputes have characterized the application of
this principle in the context of international trade with
5. See discussion infra Part II.A.
6. Id.
7. See Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.N.Y. 1886); John A. Young,
Jr., The Gray Market Case: Trademark Rights v. Consumer Interests, 61 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 838, 840 (1986).
8. See discussion infra Parts II.A, III.A–B.
9. One exception to this principle, however, is the case of countries
allowing concurrent registration owned by different entities in separate parts of
the country as, for example, in the United States. In such a case, the goods
carrying one of the concurrently registered marks can circulate only in the
specific part of the United States covered by the registration and cannot be
marketed in the part of the United States designated for the other concurrent
registration. Trademark (Lanham) Act of 1946 § 2(d), 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d)
(2006) [hereinafter Lanham Act]. Another exception to this principle is the
coexistence of non-registered and registered marks in the same jurisdiction.
This Article does not analyze these issues, nor the relationship between state
and federal trademark registrations in countries permitting the registration of
marks under their state law and not only at a federal level, as for example in
the United States.
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respect to the parallel imports of ―gray market goods‖—i.e.,
genuine (originally manufactured) products, which are
imported into a country from unauthorized third party
importers after their first authorized sale by trademark
owners in another part of the world.10 To some extent, the
surge in global trade over the past two decades has
heightened these disputes,11 particularly in the developed
world economies, driven primarily by the concerns expressed
by multinational corporations against the arbitrage of
consumer goods from low-cost to high-cost jurisdictions.12
Although multinational corporations are interested in the
benefits of free trade to reduce manufacturing costs and
decrease tariffs, quotas, and other trade restrictions, they
generally fear and oppose gray market goods because of the
competition that these goods create in the high cost domestic
markets where they are imported, and the resulting loss of
profits for trademark owners (multinational corporations) in
those markets.13

10. This Article uses the terms ―parallel imports‖ and ―gray market goods‖
interchangeably as synonyms. Both parallel imports and gray market goods
refer to the situation where products carrying a certain mark are imported into
a market and sold there without the consent of the owner of the mark. J.
THOMAS MCCARTHY, 5 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 29:46 (4th ed. 2010). The products are ―genuine‖ and not counterfeit goods,
and have been manufactured by or under license from the trademark owner.
Id. They are, however, formulated or packaged for a particular jurisdiction and
are imported into a different country than the one intended by the trademark
owner. Id. For extensive analysis on these definitions and relevant literature
and case law, see id. See also Heath, supra note 1, at 623 (explaining that the
term parallel imports ―refers to goods produced and sold legally, and
subsequently exported‖ and that ―there is nothing ‗grey‘ about them‖).
11. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:51–51.75 (offering an overview of
the regulation of parallel imports in the United States).
12. Id. § 29:46, n.1 (including several references to professional articles
explaining how to prevent or diminish the risk of parallel imports for
corporations).
13. The corporate opposition to the unauthorized importation of gray
market products is well exemplified in the position adopted by the International
Trademark Association (INTA). In a position paper prepared by the 2006–2007
INTA Parallel Imports Committee, INTA advocated that a regime of national
exhaustion was in the best interest of trademark owners. INTA specifically
―supports the principle that international exhaustion should not apply to
parallel imports in the absence of clear proof that the trademark owners
expressly consented to such imports.‖ See INTA, Position Paper on Parallel
Imports, July 2007, available at http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTA
ParallelImports2007.pdf.
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In response to these concerns, the protection of
trademark rights, and intellectual property in general, has
played an increasingly important role in international trade
negotiations in the past decades.14
The fundamental
relationship between intellectual property and international
trade is at the heart of the Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which was enacted
in 1994 as an integral part of the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations that led to the
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO).15 Still,
because of diverging national interests among WTO
members, the exhaustion of intellectual property rights and
the regulation of parallel imports of gray market goods
proved too controversial to be addressed within the context of
TRIPS. As enacted, TRIPS declares that nothing in the
Agreement can ―be used to address the issue of the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights.‖16 Absent an
official position at the international level, WTO members
have continued to follow their preferred policies on the issue,
thus perpetuating the existing controversy in this area.17
Notwithstanding the silence in TRIPS and the corporate
opposition to the principle of trademark first sale, the
relevance of this principle to promote free trade is
undisputable.18 As repeated in most free trade agreements,
the main purpose of free trade is to eliminate all barriers to

14. See, e.g., Laurinda L. Hicks & James R. Holbein, Convergence of
National Intellectual Property Norms in International Trading Agreements, 12
AM. U.J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 769 (1997); J.H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in
International Trade: Opportunities and Risks of a GATT Connection, 22 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT‘L L. 747 (1989).
15. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
April 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULT OF THE URUGUAY
ROUNDS Vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 83 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
16. Id. art. 6.
17. On the silence of TRIPS regarding the issue of the exhaustion of all
intellectual property rights, not solely trademarks, see S.K. Verma, Exhaustion
of Intellectual Property Rights and Free Trade—Article 6 of the TRIPS
Agreements, 29 I.I.C. 534, 539 (1998). See also Hanns Ullrich, TRIPS: Adequate
Protection, Inadequate Trade, Adequate Competition Policy, 4 PAC. RIM. L. &
POL‘Y J. 153 (1995).
18. See, e.g., Herman Cohen Jehoram, International Exhaustion versus
Importation Right: A Murky Area of Intellectual Property Law, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‘L
280 (1996).
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―legitimate trade‖19 and to promote the unrestricted
circulation of goods in the international, regional, or national
market.20 Accordingly, international trade or trade among
members of free trade areas can effectively be ―free‖ only if,
among other trade barriers, the exercise of national
trademark rights is considered exhausted with respect to the
distribution of gray market goods after their first lawful sale
in any country of the world (international trademark
exhaustion) or at least within the territory of the members of
free trade areas (regional trademark exhaustion).21
In recent years, however, even in countries adopting
regimes of international or regional trademark exhaustion,
multinational corporations have increasingly raised an
additional argument against the principle of trademark first
sale to prevent the importation of gray market goods: the
―material different product quality‖ of the goods they
distribute in separate national markets.22
Notably,
multinational corporations frequently manufacture or
package products with minor variations in their quality or
post-sale services to satisfy local preferences, take advantage
of local requirements, or simply to diversify international
markets. Still, they usually market these materially different
products under the same mark in separate countries because
of the advantages of brand recognition given the widespread
international movement of goods and people.23 In recent

19. See discussion infra Part III.A–B; see also North American Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex. Art. 1701(1), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993)
[hereinafter NAFTA].
20. On the differences between national and international exhaustion, see
generally Jesper Rasmussen, The Principle of Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights
Pursuant to Directive 89/104 (and Regulation 40/94), 4 E.I.P.R. 174 (1995).
21. See discussion infra Part III.
22. HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 153.
23. Corporations usually cannot, however, intentionally market products of
different quality under the same mark in a single jurisdiction. For example, all
cans of Coca-Cola Classic distributed in the United States by The Coca-Cola
Company have to be the same in terms of formula, etc., even if The Coca-Cola
Company can use the ―main‖ mark Coca-Cola for other lines of (qualitatively
identical) products in the same market (e.g., Coca-Cola Zero), or can decide to
change the quality of all Coca-Cola Classic cans marketed in the United States
in the future. Companies can at times market products of different quality (e.g.,
special releases), but these differences have to be clearly advertised to
consumers. In contrast, the intentional distribution of identically looking goods
of different quality (e.g., Coca-Cola Classic with different ingredients) is
considered a misleading use of a mark that could lead to cancellation of the
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years, multinational corporations have repeatedly argued
that consumers may be confused if two seemingly identical
but materially different products are sold in the same
national market under the same mark as a result of the
importation of gray market products.24 In several instances,
national courts have accepted this argument and blocked the
importation of materially different gray market products (also
from members of the same free trade area) into their national
territory.25 Not surprisingly, this has in turn undermined the
process of international market integration and free trade in
general.
This Article explores this intricate aspect of trademark
law and international trade, with particular attention to the
argument of ―materially different product quality‖ and its
impact on the effectiveness of the principle of trademark first
sale to promote free trade internationally and, in particular,
within free trade areas. The reminder of this Article proceeds
as follows. Part II recounts the history of the principle of
trademark first sale and illustrates the alternative national
positions that countries have traditionally adopted with
respect to the admissibility of gray market goods into their
territory. Part III analyzes the different approaches to the
principle of trademark first sale and the importation of
materially different gray market goods adopted, specifically,
by NAFTA and EU members, and the resulting process of
market integration in those free trade areas. Part IV
compares the approaches adopted by NAFTA and EU
members and stresses that, in general, effective market
integration in free trade areas can be achieved only by
adopting uniform national rules that permit parallel imports
from other members combined with the prohibition of
domestic measures that limit the importation of genuine but
materially different products. In particular, Part IV suggests
that members of free trade areas can facilitate the long term
free movement of genuine but materially different products in
their territory by harmonizing, or at least approximating,
mark and would amount to consumer fraud, at least in the United States. See
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.A. (considering the issues related to the
distribution of gray market products of ―materially different‖ quality in the
national jurisdictions of Canada, the United States, and Mexico).
25. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B.
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national product standards and by adopting the same
common standards.
As a complementary and more
immediate solution, however, Part IV highlights that
members of free trade areas can individually adopt national
principles of mutual recognition of products coming from
other members, or accept into their territory the importation
of gray market goods carrying labels that disclose to the
public any material difference in product quality. Because of
the possible conflicts of the mutual recognition approach with
the WTO principles of non-discrimination and most-favorednation, this Article concludes that the acceptance into the
domestic markets of the importation of gray market goods
adequately labeled to prevent consumer confusion seems to
represent the most effective (although imperfect) approach to
currently promote free trade in free trade areas alongside the
harmonization of technical standards.
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TRADEMARK FIRST SALE
AND FREE TRADE
This Section offers an overview of the principle of
trademark first sale, and the relationship between this
principle and international trade.
First, this Section
illustrates the basic functions of trademarks, the traditional
scope of trademark protection, and the theory behind the
principle of trademark first sale as a means to remove
trademark owners‘ control on product distribution in the
market. Second, this Section emphasizes the impact of the
principle of trademark first sale in international trade and
the different approaches taken by individual countries, which
are divided into national, international, and regional
trademark exhaustion.
A. Basics of Trademark Protection, Trademark First Sale,
and Free Trade
Trademarks perform a variety of functions in the modern
economy. First, trademarks enable producers to inform
consumers about the origin and the quality of their products
in a market increasingly dominated by similar and competing
products.26 In addition to indicating commercial origin and
26. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 265–66 (1987) (―[T]rademark law . . .
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guaranteeing consistent product quality, trademarks are also
valuable advertising tools and manifestations of trademark
goodwill that attract consumers because of the reputation or
other values that the public attaches to, and associates with,
the marks.27 Historically, trademark law has protected these
different trademark functions.28 As mentioned before, the
core of trademark rights resides in the ability of trademark
owners to exclude third parties from using identical or similar
marks on identical or similar products when such use could
lead to a likelihood of consumer confusion.29 For the owners
of famous marks, trademark protection also extends to
identical or similar signs used on non-similar products when
this use is likely to take unfair advantage of, or damage, the
mark‘s distinctiveness or reputation.30
The right of trademark owners to exclude others from
using identical or similar marks has been traditionally
limited, however, by the limits imposed upon trademark
owners by the principle of trademark first sale or trademark
exhaustion. This principle explicitly provides that the right
can best be explained on the hypothesis that the law is trying to promote
economic efficiency.‖); see also Nicholas S. Economides, The Economics of
Trademarks, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 523, 526 (1988); William P. Kratzke,
Normative Economic Analysis of Trademark Law, 21 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 199,
205 (1991).
27. See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40
HARV. L. REV. 813, 818 (1927) (―The true functions of the trademark are, then,
to identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases
by the consuming public.‖).
28. See, e.g., Anselm Kamperman Sanders & Spyros M. Maniatis, A
Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and Quality, 11 E.I.P.R. 406
(1993). See also the famous passage of the United States Senate Reports
introducing the Lanham Act and stating that trademark protection has a
twofold purpose.
S. REP. NO. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1274. ―One is to protect the public so it may be confident
that . . . it will get the product which it asks for . . . . Secondly, where the owner
of a trademark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public
the product, he is protected in his investment from its misappropriation by
pirates and cheats.‖ Id.
29. See, e.g., Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis, supra note 28, at 406.
30. See TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 16(3). ―Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention (1967) shall apply . . . to goods and services which are not similar to
those in respect of which a mark is registered, provided that the use of that
trademark . . . would indicate a connection between those goods or services and
the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the
owner of the registered trademark are likely damaged by such use.‖ Id.
Because of its limited scope, this Article does not elaborate on individual
national anti-dilution provisions and leading cases.
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of a trademark owner ―to control distribution of its
trademarked product does not extend beyond the first sale of
the product.‖31 Thus, ―[the] resale by the first purchaser of
the original article under the producer‘s trademark is neither
trademark infringement nor unfair competition.‖32 The only
exception to this principle is that trademark rights are not
exhausted, and trademark owners can oppose future product
distribution, when third parties have altered the quality of
the marked products without the consent of trademark
owners after the first authorized sale of the products in the
market.33 In these instances, trademark owners can oppose
the future circulation of the products that they have initially
distributed because consumers rely on the marks affixed to
those products as signs of authenticity as to the products‘
origin and quality, and would thus believe that those quality
alterations originate with, or are authorized by, trademark
owners.34 This, in turn, would undermine the traditional
functions of trademarks as indicators of commercial origin
and guarantors of consistent quality, and would also unfairly
affect and damage the reputation of trademark owners.35
Theoretically, the principle of trademark first sale finds
its rationale in the assumption that trademarks must not be
used as a tool to control market distribution or as a means of
market division contrary to their function as indicators of
commercial origin and product quality.36 Whether third
parties resell trademarked products after their first
authorized sale in the market with or without the trademark
31. Sebastian Int‘l, Inc. v. Longs Drug Stores Corp., 53 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th
Cir. 1995). The premise of the first sale is that ―the consumer gets exactly what
the consumer bargains for, the genuine product of the particular producer.‖ Id.
at 1075.
32. Id. at 1074.
33. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:37 (offering an extensive analysis of
the relevant statutes and cases under U.S. law). Because of its limited scope,
this Article does not elaborate on the issue of the sale of ―expired‖ products and
whether the principle of first sale is applicable in those instances. According to
this Author, in the instance of products with a mandatory expiration because of
safety standards, the sale of expired products is directly forbidden regardless of
whether the products are sold by trademark owners or third party importers.
15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2006).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Beier, supra note 1, at 61–62; Cohen Jehoram, supra note 18, at 280.
See also MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:51.75 (discussing the quality function
of trademarks in the context of parallel imports).
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owners‘ authorization, these sales do not imperil traditional
trademark functions nor do they create consumer confusion
with respect to the marked products—the products are and
remain genuine (original) products and the marks continue to
indicate to consumers the products‘ commercial origin and
quality regardless of the identity of the actual distributor of
the goods.37 Undoubtedly, the unauthorized sale of genuine
products limits trademark owners‘ ability to control the
channeling of their products in the market, including their
ability to portray the goods under specific conditions of
desirability or exclusivity. These sales also create additional
competition for trademark owners.38
Trademark law,
however, has never protected the ability of trademark owners
to design the conditions under which products are released
into the market because this would necessarily create
trademark monopolies.39
Historically, the origin of the principle of trademark first
sale dates back to the late nineteenth century, when
unprecedented economic change led to a rise in product
manufacturing and a growing availability of commercial
goods.40 As a result of these changes, product distribution
became increasingly sophisticated, adding new layers of
intermediaries to the traditional channels of product
marketing.41 To counter trademark owners‘ attempts to
37. See Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 248 n.2 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (― ‗Genuine‘ goods are goods that are in fact manufactured by the
same manufacturer that supplies the U.S. trademark holder. . . . [T]hey are the
genuine article, although they may not have been intended for distribution in
the U.S. market.‖).
38. See, e.g., Vincent N. Palladino, Gray Market Goods: The United States
Trademark Owners’ View, 79 TRADEMARK REP. 158 (1989) (offering a
comprehensive survey of the history and case law on parallel imports and
concluding that these imports cause detriment to trademark owners and
consumers); see also INTA, supra note 13.
39. See, e.g., Beier, supra note 1, at 72 (―[T]hese economic interests are not
protected by trademark law. They can only be considered within the framework
of the law against unfair competition, by contract law, and the law of torts.‖).
40. For the evolution of the functions of trademarks, see generally Thomas
D. Drescher, The Transformation and Evolution of Trademarks—From Signals
to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992).
41. See, e.g., Sidney A. Diamond, The Historical Development of
Trademarks, 73 TRADEMARK REP. 222, 237 (1983). ―The industrial revolution
was characterized by an enormous growth of industry as modern manufacturing
methods replaced the handwork of older times. . . . Along with the growth of
distribution came the use of advertising to acquaint the consuming public with
the availability of the goods.‖ Id.

CALBOLI_FINAL

1252

5/31/2011 5:53 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:51

control product distribution after a product (or a batch of
products) had been introduced into the market, courts on both
sides of the Atlantic concluded that manufacturers could not
use trademark rights to bind the buyers of their goods—
retailers and consumers—to their desired terms of
subsequent sale, for example, by fixing prices for retailers or
preventing secondary markets for used goods.42 This position
directly responded to the pressing need to delineate ―a
necessary demarcation line between two colliding properties:
the intellectual property right of the producer and the
common proprietary right of the owner of [the] product he has
bought.‖43 To avoid extending trademark rights beyond the
traditional scope of trademark protection—protecting
consumers and competition in the market—courts and
trademark theorists agreed that the proprietary owner of a
product ―should remain free to enjoy the specific privileges of
traditional ownership: he should be free to resell or otherwise
dispose of his property.‖ 44
As mentioned earlier, the acceptance of the principle of
first sale has rarely been questioned for the unauthorized sale
of genuine goods originating within national markets.45
Countries worldwide, however, ―have struggled with the
question whether [trademark owners] ought to be able to
block‖ parallel imports of genuine products originating
outside the national markets.46 In the past, both American
42. See HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 28–36 (surveying the early decisions in
this respect in the United States and the United Kingdom); Beier, supra note 1,
at 49–50 (analyzing the most relevant decisions in the United States, United
Kingdom, Germany and the European market, and stressing the role of the Max
Planck Institute in following the developments on the issue).
43. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 18, at 280 (recounting that ―[t]he dogmatic
explanation of this exhaustion rule . . . has been provided by the patriarch of
intellectual property law: Josef Kohler‖). See also HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 29–
30 (commenting on Kohler‘s role in creating the doctrine of universality in
trademark law).
44. Cohen Jehoram, supra note 18, at 280. Trademark owners, however,
can still impose distribution and post-sale restrictions with ad hoc contracts and
specific clauses in licensing agreements. The instances nonetheless fall outside
the scope of trademark law and, because of its limited scope, outside the scope of
this Article.
45. See discussion supra Part I.
46. HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 1 (quoting Kaoru Takamatsu, Parallel
Importation of Trademarked Goods: A Comparative Analysis, 57 WASH. L. REV.
433 (1982)). Parallel importers sell products outside the distribution system
designed by trademark owners, thus limiting the ability of trademark owners to
maximize profits by using discriminatory pricing across jurisdictions, which in
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and European courts have settled this issue by invoking the
principle of ―common origin‖ of trademarks and trademarked
products.47 Even if courts accepted the position that the
nature of trademark rights is ―territorial‖ and not
―universal‖—i.e., that trademark rights have independent
existence in separate national jurisdictions48—they allowed
the importation of gray market products that had been
distributed in foreign countries when the marks affixed to the
products belonged to, or were controlled by, the same entities
inside and outside their jurisdictions (common origin).49
Courts thus prevented the importation of gray market goods
as trademark infringement only in two instances: when the
marks were identical or confusingly similar to pre-existing
national marks owned by unrelated entities;50 or when
unauthorized third party importers had altered the quality of
turn could reduce revenues for corporations and, by extension, for the economy
of their countries. Id. at 2 (quoting the distributor of PENTAX cameras in the
United States who complained about gray market goods because ―up to 30% of
[their] sales were lost to the diverters‖).
47. See discussion infra Part III.
48. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:1 (―Under the territoriality doctrine,
a trademark is recognized as having a separate existence in each sovereign
territory in which it is registered or legally recognized as a mark.‖). In the
nineteenth century, several countries instead applied the theory of
―universality‖ of trademarks, which posits that a mark signifies the same source
no matter where it is used in the world. Critically, on the principle of
territoriality, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: Detaching
Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885 (2004); Timothy
H. Hiebert, Foundations of the Law of Parallel Importation: Duality and
Universality in Nineteenth Century Trademark Law, 80 TRADEMARK REP. 483,
487–95 (1990); Marshall A. Leaffer, The New World of International Trademark
Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 28 (1998) (―[T]he territorial model of
trademark law in such a world is an anachronism and, from a practical
standpoint, hardly exists in its pure form.‖).
49. Hiebert, supra note 48, at 487–95. Because of its limited scope, this
Article does not elaborate on the differences between common ownerships,
subsidiaries, or strategic trademark assignments between parent companies
and their local subsidiaries in other jurisdictions. These nuances, however, may
still be significant under certain national laws with respect to the lawfulness of
gray market products. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:49. This Article,
instead, refers to all marks controlled in some way by the same entities as
―marks having a common origin‖ and distinguishes these marks from those
which are owned by separate entities while discussing the application of the
principle of first sale and the lawfulness of gray market products in the
particular jurisdictions at issue.
50. This does not include, however, the strategic assignment of marks in
separate jurisdictions to bypass the principle of trademark exhaustion. Because
of its limited extent, this Article does not elaborate on the important aspects of
this issue for parallel imports.
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the products without the knowledge and the consent of
trademark owners after the first sale of the products into a
foreign market by trademark owners.51 To date, several
countries continue to permit the importation of gray market
goods manufactured under the same mark and sold in
different countries by multinational corporations under the
principle of common origin.52 Still, as this Article elaborates,
influential corporate interests have increasingly challenged
this position and have used product diversification across
separate national markets as an increasingly important
means to control international trade and prevent the
importation of gray market goods.53
B. Trademark Territoriality and Alternative Approaches to
Trademark First Sale
Although not unanimously accepted, the modern
interpretation of trademark rights is based primarily on the
principle of territoriality.54 An explicit expression of national
sovereignty, the principle of territoriality of trademark rights
is at the heart of the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property (Paris Convention)55 and TRIPS,56 the
51. See discussion infra Part III.
52. For example, Canada, the United States and Mexico still apply the
principle of international exhaustion of trademark rights. See infra Part III.A;
see also CHRISTOPHER HEATH, PARALLEL IMPORTS IN ASIA 1 (2004).
53. See, e.g., HIEBERT, supra note 1, at 151; MCCARTHY, supra note 10, §
29:50–51.75.
54. Although the same marks are used by the same corporations to identify
the same products in separate national markets, trademark rights are
territorial in nature insofar as they are acquired nationally based upon
requirements set by national laws to identify products within the national
territory, and enforced nationally based upon national principles of trademark
infringement and dilution. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:1; Dinwoodie,
supra note 48, at 887. Further, trademark disputes are decided nationally by
national institutions selected according to national laws. Dinwoodie, supra note
48, at 887.
55. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305, available at http://www.wipo.int/treatie
s/en/ip/paris/pdf/trtdocs_wo020.pdf [hereinafter Paris Convention]. The Paris
Convention was originally enacted in 1883, and subsequently revised in
Brussels in 1900, Washington in 1911, The Hague in 1925, London in 1934,
Lisbon in 1958, and Stockholm in 1967. Id. Article 6(3) of the Paris Convention
expressly provides that ―[a] mark duly registered in a country of the [Paris]
Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in other countries
of the Union, including the country of origin.‖ Id. art. 6(3). One hundred
seventy-three countries worldwide are currently members of the Paris
Convention. See Paris Convention Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL
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two most relevant international treaties on the
harmonization of national trademark laws. Still, nothing in
the Paris Convention or TRIPS establishes a common position
for members with respect to trademark exhaustion, and
national first sale rules remain a choice for each
jurisdiction.57 In particular, Article 6 of TRIPS states that
―[f]or the purposes of dispute settlement under this
Agreement . . . nothing in this Agreement shall be used to
address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property
rights.‖58 According to the Paris Convention and TRIPS,
however, member countries should prevent, and allow
trademark owners to object to, the importation into their
territory of gray market goods that carry marks identical or
similar to pre-existing and unrelated national trademark
rights outside the principle of common origin. Under the
Paris Convention and TRIPS these occurrences explicitly
constitute infringement of national trademark rights because
of the resulting likelihood of confusion for consumers in the
markets where these goods are imported.59
In the absence of a mandatory international guideline
harmonizing national positions on trademark first sale,
PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lan
g=en&treaty_id=2 (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
56. TRIPS, supra note 15. To date, 153 countries are members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO). See Members and Observers, WORLD TRADE ORGAN
IZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last
visited Mar. 7, 2011). Although TRIPS entered into force in 1996, developing
countries and least-developed countries enjoyed additional transition periods to
implement TRIPS (which has now been extended until 2013, and until 2016 for
pharmaceutical patents and undisclosed information). See Understanding the
WTO: The Agreements; Transition Arrangements: 1, 5 or 11 Years or More,
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif
_e/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2011).
57. In the EU this choice falls with European Institutions. See discussion
infra Part. III.B.
58. TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 6. On the drafting of Article 6 of TRIPS, see
Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 508 (noting that this provision represents a
compromise between two opposite approaches: ―[t]he US Proposal [to introduce
its own national system,] national exhaustion[,] and the [pleas of] developing
countries . . . for the opposite,‖ international exhaustion); Stanislaw
Soltysinsky, International Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights Under the
TRIPS, the EC Law and the Europe Agreements, 4 G.R.U.R. INT‘L 316, 317–20
(1996); Verma, supra note 17, at 552–62 (―A review of TRIPS started in 2000
and it was believed that one issue which may be considered was the question of
parallel import[ation] and [trademark] exhaustion.‖).
59. See Paris Convention, supra note 55, arts. 9, 10, and 10bis; TRIPS,
supra note 15, art. 16.

CALBOLI_FINAL

1256

5/31/2011 5:53 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:51

members of the Paris Convention and TRIPS have thus
adopted different approaches with respect to the geographical
extent of their national regimes of trademark exhaustion.60
As indicated in Part I, these positions are based directly on
differing national interests regarding free trade and the
importation of genuine gray market goods into their markets,
and can be grouped into three categories: national
exhaustion,
international
exhaustion,
and
regional
exhaustion of trademark rights.
Undoubtedly the least friendly position with respect to
free trade, the principle of national exhaustion provides that
national trademark rights are considered exhausted only
when a product, or a batch of products, have been distributed
for sale into the domestic territory by the owner of the mark,
or with his consent by, for example, an affiliated company, a
licensee, distributor, or agent.61
Under this principle,
trademark
owners
cannot
object
to
the
future
commercialization of those products after their first sale in
the domestic market unless third parties alter the product
quality so as to create consumer confusion.62 Trademark
owners, however, can still oppose the importation into the
domestic market of genuine goods bearing their trademark (of
the same or different quality) that have been first distributed
outside the national territory by trademark owners
themselves or with their consent. Likewise, trademark
owners can object to the reentry of genuine products that
have been exported outside the domestic market after their
authorized first sale in the domestic territory.63
Not
surprisingly, trademark owners have traditionally favored
this principle versus other categories of trademark
exhaustion because it affords them the ability to price

60. See Soltysinsky, supra note 58, at 317–20.
61. To date, national exhaustion with respect to trademark rights seem to
be a less frequent choice among WTO members, even though most members
practice national exhaustion with respect to patents and copyrights. See INTA,
supra note 13, at 5. National trademark exhaustion is nonetheless the principle
favored by multinational corporations and the INTA because it is the most
favorable toward trademark owners. See id.
62. See discussion supra Part II.A.
63. See generally Rasmussen, supra note 20, at 174 (describing the effects of
the different types of trademark exhaustion).
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differentiate and control product distribution across different
jurisdictions.64
More favorable toward free trade, the principle of
international exhaustion states instead that national
trademark rights are considered exhausted after a product, or
a batch of products, have been distributed for sale by the
owner of the mark or with her consent anywhere in the
world.65 In countries adopting international exhaustion,
trademark owners cannot object to the importation of gray
market goods carrying their marks that were first marketed
outside the national market or the reentry of genuine goods
that were exported abroad after their first domestic sale.66
Trademark owners, however, are still free to oppose the
importation of products that have been altered without their
consent; this is intended to protect consumers against
confusion, and to protect the reputation of the trademark
owners.67 In some of the jurisdictions applying international
exhaustion, trademark owners can object also to the
importation of gray market products that, although genuine,
are of materially different quality than the products
distributed under authorization by trademark owners in the
national market.68 Theoretically, this objection is justified
because these differences in quality could lead to consumer
confusion. As indicated earlier, however, these differences
are often the result of corporate strategies and are directly
intended to prevent parallel trade and control international
product distribution.69
Lastly, as a hybrid solution between national and
international exhaustion for countries desiring to promote
free trade, but mainly at a regional (rather than worldwide)
level, a third type of trademark exhaustion has emerged in
the past half century—regional exhaustion. Under this
principle, national trademark rights granted by each member
of a regional agreement are exhausted after the trademark
owner places a product, or a batch of products, on the market
64. INTA, supra note 13, at 5.
65. See, e.g., Verma, supra note 17, at 539.
66. Id.
67. See TRIPS, supra note 15, art. 16 (providing the general principle
against trademark infringement that member countries have to follow); Paris
Convention, supra note 55, arts. 9, 10, and 10bis (same).
68. See discussion infra Part III.A.
69. See discussion infra Part IV.A–B.
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in any of the national territories of the members of the
agreement.70 Under this regime, trademark owners cannot
object to the further circulation of their products within the
boundaries of the regional agreement regardless of which
country the first sale of the products occurred within the
region.71 Trademark owners, however, may still oppose the
importation of gray market products that have been
introduced into the market outside the national territory of
the members of the regional agreement as well as the reentry
of products that have left the regional market to be exported
outside the territory of the members of the regional
agreement.72 As elaborated below, to date, the most notable
example of a regional integration adopting the principle of
regional exhaustion of trademark rights is the European
Union.73
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TRADEMARK FIRST SALE IN NORTH
AMERICA AND EUROPE
This Section examines the positions taken with respect to
the principle of trademark first sale and the importation of
materially different gray market products by the members of
NAFTA and the EU, respectively. Both NAFTA and the EU
seek to create free trade areas, but differ considerably in the
level of integration achieved among their members. First,
this Section introduces NAFTA and illustrates the national
regimes on trademark exhaustion adopted by Canada, the
United States, and Mexico. Second, this Section describes the
creation of the European internal market and the adoption of
the principle of regional exhaustion to promote free trade in
the EU.
A. NAFTA and the Laissez Faire Approach to National First
Sale Rules
The adoption of NAFTA in 1994 marked the creation of a
free trade area covering Canada, the United States, and
70. See Rasmussen, supra note 20, at 174.
71. Id.
72. See discussion infra Part III.B for the cases decided by the Court of
Justice of the European Union (ECJ), clarifying that trademark owners in the
EU can not prevent the parallel trade within the European market but can
oppose the importation of gray market products coming from outside the EU.
73. See discussion infra Part III.B.

CALBOLI_FINAL

2011]

5/31/2011 5:53 PM

MARKET INTEGRATION AND FIRST SALE

1259

Mexico,74 the purpose of which was, in principle, to eliminate
all barriers to trade and facilitate free movement of goods
across member countries.75 Adopted two years prior to the
implementation of TRIPS, NAFTA was also the first
international trade agreement to impose detailed obligations
on its members to protect intellectual property rights.76
Specifically, Article 1701 of NAFTA requires that member
countries provide ―adequate and effective protection and
enforcement of intellectual property rights‖ in each Party‘s
territory;77 these measures, however, should not ―become
barriers to legitimate trade.‖78 According to Article 1704,
NAFTA members can also specify licensing practices or
conditions in their domestic law that may have an adverse
effect on market competition and they can also adopt
measures to prevent and control these practices or conditions
subject to the general principles of the agreement.79
Despite this commitment to promote free trade and
integrate the markets of member countries, NAFTA does not
address the issue of exhaustion of intellectual property rights,
including trademark exhaustion.80 Instead, similar to TRIPS,
NAFTA leaves member countries free to adopt their preferred
position with respect to the geographical extent of their
national rules on trademark first sale and the importation of
gray market goods into their territories.81 In the absence of
any guidance or harmonization in this area, NAFTA members
74. NAFTA, supra note 19.
75. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 102. ―The objectives of this Agreement . . .
are to . . . eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border
movement of, goods and services between the territories of the Parties, . . .
promote conditions of fair competition in the free trade area . . . .‖ Id. See also
discussion infra Part IV.A.
76. NAFTA, supra note 19, Ch. 17. Most likely as a result of the ongoing
TRIPS negotiation at the time of the adoption of NAFTA, NAFTA provisions are
largely modeled after TRIPS. See Hicks & Holbein, supra note 14, at 791.
77. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1701(1).
78. Id. See also, e.g., George Y. Gonzalez, An Analysis of the Legal
Implications of the Intellectual Property Provisions of the North American Free
Trade Agreement, 34 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 305, 306 (1993) (discussing NAFTA
treatment of intellectual property rights).
79. NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 1704.
80. See Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 308 (noting the lack of common rules on
the issue of parallel imports among NAFTA members).
81. Id. See also Theodore H. Davis Jr., Territoriality and Exhaustion of
Trademark Rights Under the Laws of the North Atlantic Nations, 89
TRADEMARK REP. 657 (1999) (describing the approach adopted by Canada and
the United States with respect to parallel imports).
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thus continue to adopt their pre-NAFTA national policies.
Nevertheless, even without an ad hoc harmonization of
national rules, NAFTA members adopt consistent national
positions with respect to trademark first sale and the
importation of genuine but materially different goods into
their territories. Notably, NAFTA members individually
practice the principle of international trademark exhaustion
within their respective territories and allow, although with
some variations, the importation of materially different gray
market goods from other NAFTA members as well as from
other foreign jurisdictions.
International exhaustion of trademark rights has been
the general rule in Canada since the late 1880s.82 Canadian
law has long established that once products have entered the
stream of trade anywhere in the world, their importation into
the national territory is permitted and does not constitute
trademark infringement when the same or affiliated owners
control the marks both inside and outside Canada (common
origin marks).83
Based upon the general principles of
trademark protection, Canadian law only prohibits as
trademark infringement the importation of products bearing
marks identical or similar to marks already in use in the
national territory when these marks are not owned or
controlled by the same entity and the importation of those
goods could create consumer confusion.84 Still, Canadian
82. Condy v. Taylor (1887), 56 L.T.R. 891 (Ch.) (stating that no trademark
infringement occurs when the goods are genuine goods manufactured by
trademark owners).
83. See Wilkinson Sword (Can.) Ltd. v. Juda (1966), 51 C.P.R. 55 (Can.);
Wella Canada Inc. v. Pearlon Products Ltd. (1984), 4 C.P.R. 3d 287 (Can. Ont.
H.C.J.); Coca-Cola Ltd. v. Pardham, (1999) 85 C.P.R. 3d 489 (Can. F.C.A.). For
further analysis, see Davis, supra note 81, at 721–30.
84. See Consumers Distributing Co. v. Seiko Time Canada Ltd. (1984), 1
C.P.R. 3d 1, 13–14 (Can. S.C.C.). This decision was codified in the Canadian
Trade-marks Act of 1985, SC 1952-53, c. 49, as amended, RSC 1985, c. T-10
(Can). Section 7(b) provides that ―[n]o person shall . . . direct public attention to
his wares, services or business in such a way as to cause or be likely to cause
confusion in Canada . . . between his wares, services or business and the wares,
services and business of another.‖ Canadian Trade-marks Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.
T-13 § 7(b). Section 19 states that a national registration ―gives to the owner of
the trade-mark the exclusive right to the use throughout Canada of the trademark in respect of those wares or services.‖ Id. § 19. Section 20 provides that
―[t]he right of the owner of a registered trade-mark to its exclusive use shall be
deemed to be infringed by a person not entitled to its use under this Act who
sells, distributes or advertises wares or services in association with a confusing
trade-mark or trade-name . . . .‖ Id. § 20.
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courts have occasionally objected to the importation of gray
market goods carrying common origin marks when these
goods were materially different from the products authorized
in the Canadian market and when these differences could
harm consumers or the public good.85 For example, Canadian
courts have prevented the importation of genuine gray
market goods because the goods had been damaged and the
distributor had replaced the labels that were originally
removed by trademark owners.86 Canadian courts have also
prevented the importation of gray market goods because the
formulation of those goods was different than the products
sold nationally and could cause consumer confusion.87
Canadian courts have also carefully scrutinized the
importation of products that required compliance with
technical standards and only allowed their sale if importers
disclosed to the public any differences with respect to product
standards.88 Generally, however, Canadian courts have been
―relatively sympathetic‖ toward unauthorized parallel
importers and rarely prohibit the importation of gray market
goods into Canada when the importers use labels to cure the
risk of a likelihood of consumer confusion because of products‘
material differences after the products have been distributed
into the national territory.89
85. In this respect, the position of Canadian courts has been defined as
―inconsistent.‖ Davis, supra note 81, at 730. ―The significance of material
differences in goods sought to be imported to the exhaustion of trademark rights
has been the subject of inconsistent decisions under Canadian law.‖ Id.
Compare Mattel Canada Inc. v. GTS Acquisitions Ltd. (1989), 27 C.P.R. 3d 358
(Can. F.C.A.), with Smith & Nephew Inc. v. Glen Oak Inc. (1996), 68 CPR 3d
153 (Can. F.C.A.). Compare also Consumers Distributing, 1 C.P.R. 3d 1, with
Sharp Electronic of Canada Ltd. v. Continental Electronic Info. Inc. (1988), 23
C.P.R. 3d 330 (Can. B.C.S.C.).
86. Dupont of Canada Ltd. v. Nomad Trading Co. (1968), 55 C.P.R. 97 (Can.
Que. S.C.).
87. See H.J. Heinz Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Edan Foods Sales Inc. (1991), 35
C.P.R. 3d 213 (Can. F.C.T.D.) (finding potential consumer confusion between
the formulation of ketchup in Canada and the United States because of the
different tomatoes used in the respective products).
88. Consumers Distributing, 1 C.P.R. 3d 1. But see Sharp Electronic, 23
C.P.R. 3d 330 (enjoining the further importation of facsimile machines because
the goods were ―inherently different in quality‖ from those sold by the plaintiff
in Canada).
89. Davis, supra note 81, at 732. Consumers Distributing, 1 C.P.R. 3d, at
24–25 (noting that the notice affixed to the products neutralized the significance
of any difference in the products‘ warranties). See also Nestle Enterprises Ltd.
v. Edan Sales Inc. (1991), 37 C.P.R. 3d 480 (Can. F.C.A.) (stating that ―[t]he
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Similar to Canada, the United States has also
traditionally followed a system of international exhaustion,90
and has prevented parallel imports only for products that
carry marks identical or similar to marks already in use in
the United States by third parties.91 U.S. law explicitly
allows parallel imports of gray market goods when ―both the
foreign and the U.S. trademark are owned by the same
person or business entity‖ or the owners of these marks are
―parent and subsidiary companies or otherwise subjected to
common ownership and control.‖92 Similar to Canada, U.S.
courts nonetheless have allowed trademark owners to prevent
the importation of gray market products when they ―differ
materially‖ from the goods authorized for sale in the domestic
market even if the marks share a common ownership or
control inside and outside the United States.93 This rule was
evidence does not satisfy . . . that Mountain Blend is an ‗inferior‘ product. It is
simply different from the plaintiff‘s pure coffee blends and that difference is
adequately stated on the label.‖).
90. Originally, U.S. courts allowed parallel imports based on the principle of
―universality‖ of trademark rights. See Hunyadi Janos Corp. v. Steger, 285 F.
861 (2d Cir. 1922); Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening, 238 F. 780 (2d Cir.
1916); Apollinaris Co. v. Scherer, 27 F. 18 (C.C.N.Y. 1886). In A. Bourjois & Co.
v. Katzel, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev’d, 260 U.S. 689 (1923), the Supreme
Court affirmed that marks have separate existence in separate national
territories. See also American Circuit Breaker Corp. v. Oregon Breakers Inc.,
406 F.3d 577 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting that in Katzel the Supreme Court ―marked
a dramatic change in trademark law by adopting the principle of ‗territoriality‘
of trademarks and moving away from the rule of ‗universality‘ ‖); HIEBERT,
supra note 1, at 103.
91. The U.S. Tariff Act prohibits the importation of a product ―that bears a
trademark owned by a citizen of . . . the United States and is registered in the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office.‖ See Tariff Act of 1930 § 526(a), 19 U.S.C.S.
§ 1526(a) (2006). The Lanham Act bars the importation of goods with a mark
that will ―copy or simulate‖ a registered trademark. Lanham Act § 42, 15
U.S.C. § 1124 (2006). The Lanham Act also applies the traditional provisions
against infringement to confusingly similar products. Lanham Act §§ 32(a)
(registered marks), 43(b) (unregistered marks), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(a), 1125(b).
92. K-Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281, 289 (1988) (indicating that
the ―extraordinary protection‖ afforded by the Tariff Act § 526 is exclusively for
domestic U.S. trademark owners that have no corporate affiliation with the
foreign manufacturer). For further analysis on this principle and other judicial
references on the point, see MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:49.
93. This principle follows two decisions of the D.C. Circuit: Lever Bros. Co.
v. United States, 877 F.2d 101 (D.C. Cir. 1989) and Lever Bros. Co. v. United
States, 981 F.2d 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1993). The court confirmed that when a mark
is applied to physically different goods, the mark is not ―genuine‖ for the
American consumer and the affiliation between the producers does not reduce
the confusion that could result from those differences. Lever Bros., 877 F.2d
101; Lever Bros., 981 F.2d 1330.
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adopted in the Lever Brothers cases to avoid the potential
confusion that could otherwise be created for consumers if
two seemingly identical products are sold in the U.S. market
under the same marks but have different material
characteristics.94 As an exception to the Lever Brothers rule,
however, the U.S. Customs Service Regulations provide that
materially different products can still lawfully enter into the
U.S. territory when importers properly label those goods with
a notice stating: ―This product is not authorized by the United
States trademark owner for importation and is materially
different from the authorized products.‖95 As a result, as long
as products are properly labeled according to the U.S.
Customs Regulations, trademark owners cannot rely on the
Lever Brothers rule (and on material product differences) to
prevent the importation of otherwise genuine products into
the U.S. market. In other words, under U.S. Customs Service
Regulations, proper labeling can guarantee that marks
continue to serve the traditional trademark functions—
indicating to consumers that the marked products are the
same goods, in terms of commercial origin and quality, which
were first distributed in the market by trademark owners.96
Finally, like Canada and the United States, Mexico also
adopts a system of international trademark first sale as a
domestic policy.97 According to Article 92(II) of the Mexican
94. Lever Bros., 877 F.2d at 103; Lever Bros., 981 F.2d at 1331. See also
Societe Des Produits Nestle, S.A. v. Casa Helvetia, Inc., 982 F.2d 633, 639 (1st
Cir. 1992) (stating that ―under section 42, as under section 32, the question of
whether [defendant] infringed the PERUGINA mark hinges on whether
physical or like material differences exist between the Italian-made and
Venezuelan-made products‖). For a detailed survey of the relevant U.S. cases,
see MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50–51.75.
95. 19 C.F.R. § 133.23(b). ―Goods determined by the Customs Service to be
physically and materially different . . . shall not be detained . . . where the
merchandise or its packaging bears a conspicuous and legible label designed to
remain on the product until the first point of sale . . . .‖ Id. ―The label must be
in close proximity to the trademark as it appears in its most prominent location
on the article itself or the retail package or container. Other information
designed to dispel consumer confusion may also be added.‖ Id. See also
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50; Mark S. Sommers & Louis J. Levy, US
Customs Amends Gray Market Import Rule, 117 TRADEMARK WORLD 32, 33
(1999).
96. MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50.
97. See generally Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 305–06 (analyzing the
phenomenon of parallel imports in the NAFTA context with particular attention
to Mexico); Bill F. Kryzda & Shaun F. Downey, Overview of Recent Changes in
Mexican Industrial Property Law and the Enforcement of Rights by the Relevant

CALBOLI_FINAL

1264

5/31/2011 5:53 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:51

Industrial Property Law,98 the registration of a mark cannot
be used against ―any person who markets, distributes,
acquires or uses the product to which the trademark is
applied for after the said product has been lawfully
introduced on the market by the owner of the registered mark
or his licensee.‖99 Specifically, ―[t]his case shall include the
import of legitimate products to which the registered mark is
applied, carried out by any person for their use, distribution
or marketing in Mexico . . . .‖100 Gray market products are
considered ―legitimate‖ under the Mexican Industrial
Property Law Regulations provided that they are introduced
into the market of the country from which they are imported
by the ―owner or licensee of the registered mark‖ and that the
owner of the mark inside and outside Mexico are ―the same
person or members of the same joint economic interest group,
or their licensees or sublicensees.‖101 Similar to Canada and
the United States, however, Mexican law prohibits as
trademark infringement the circulation of marked products
when their quality has been altered by unauthorized third
party importers,102 or when the mark has been altered or
removed altogether.103 Still, the Mexican Industrial Property
Regulations do not prevent the importation of materially
Government Authorities, 21 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 99, 101 (1995) (considering the
changes to the Mexican Industrial Property Law in 1994 as a result of Mexico‘s
signing of NAFTA).
98. Ley de Fomento y Protección de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. 4, June
27, 1991, amended by D.O. Aug. 2, 1994 (Mex.), available at http://www.wipo.int
/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128816 [hereinafter Mexican Industrial Property
Law].
99. Id. art. 92(II).
100. Id. This provision is applicable ―pursuant to the terms and conditions
laid down in the Regulations under this law.‖ Id.
101. Article 54 of the Mexican Industrial Property Regulations provides that:
it shall be presumed . . . that imported goods are legitimate where they
meet the following requirements:
I. the introduction of the goods to the market of the country from
which importation takes place must be done by the person who in
that country is the owner or licensee of the registered mark;
II. the owners of the mark registered in Mexico and in the foreign
country must, on the date on which the importation of the goods
takes place, be the same person or members of the same joint
economic interest group, or their licensees or sub licensees.
Reglamento de la Ley de la Propiedad Industrial, D.O. Nov. 23, 1994 (Mex.), art.
54, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs_new/pdf/en/mx/mx002en.pdf
[hereinafter Mexican Industrial Property Regulations].
102. Mexican Industrial Property Law, supra note 98, art. 213(XX).
103. Id. art. 213(XXI).
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different genuine gray market goods and do not require
special labeling for those goods to be admitted and lawfully
circulate in the Mexican territory.104 Moreover, to date,
Mexican courts do not seem to have halted or expressed
concern as to the importation of materially different gray
market goods into Mexico because of potential consumer
confusion.105
B. The Harmonization of National First Sale Rules in
European Trademark Law
Since the original signing of the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC or Community) in
1957, the primary objective of the members of the EEC (now
the EU) was the creation of an integrated European market
where goods, services, people, and capital could move without
restrictions.106 Since then, the European Parliament, the
European Commission (EC), and the Court of Justice of the
European Union (ECJ) have carefully balanced the protection
of intellectual property rights among member countries with
the primary objective of promoting the free movement of
goods in the European market.107 As I have illustrated in a
previous work, this has resulted in the development of a
system of region-wide exhaustion where intellectual property
104. Mexican Industrial Property Regulations, supra note 101, art. 54. The
Mexican Industrial Property Regulations are also silent as to the case of
imports concerning repackaged or relabeled goods. Id.
105. Although courts have not considered the repackaging or relabeling of
gray market products, these instances could likely fall under the prohibition of
Article 213 of the Mexican Industrial Property Law. Mexican Industrial
Property Law, supra note 98, art. 213(XX and XXI).
106. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union, Mar. 30, 2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) [hereinafter TFEU] as amended
following the entering into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on December 1, 2009.
Treaty of Lisbon, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306). A complete list of the various
amendments
to
the
original
Treaty
establishing
the
European Economic Community
(now
European
Union)
is available
at http://europa.eu/abc/treaties/ index_en.htm.
107. On the historical tension between the protection of intellectual property
and the free movement of goods in the EU, see Friedrich-Karl Beier, Industrial
Property and the Free Movement of Goods in the Internal European Market, 21
I.I.C. 131 (1990) [hereinafter Beier, Industrial Property]; Friedrich-Karl Beier,
The Doctrine of Exhaustion in EEC Trademark Law—Scope and Limits, 10
I.I.C. 20 (1979); Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising Intellectual Property
Law Within the European Community, 23 I.I.C. 622 (1992); Ulrich Löwenheim,
Trademarks and European Community Law, 9 I.I.C. 422 (1978); Willem Mak,
Trademarks and the European Common Market, 6 I.I.C. 29 (1975).
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rights, including trademark rights, are exhausted with
respect to the territory of the EU after the first sale of a
product, or a batch of products, in the EU; thereafter, those
products can freely circulate within the European market.108
As detailed below, the ECJ first adopted this principle as a
measure to foster intra-Community trade leaving member
countries free to adopt a broader regime, i.e., international
exhaustion, in their national territory. As the European
market integration intensified in the 1980s and 1990s,
Community-wide exhaustion has become the general rule for
all EU members.109
The adoption of the Community-wide exhaustion of
trademark rights traces back to the 1960s. Originally, the
ECJ turned to the antitrust provisions of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to rule that
attempts to block the free movement of goods across member
countries were ―incompatible with the common market.‖110
Starting in the 1970s, the constant tension between the
exercise of intellectual property rights and gray market goods
within the EU prompted the ECJ to rely on the principle of
free movement of goods, as settled in Articles 34 and 36 of the
TFEU, in order to effectively integrate the European internal
market. Article 34 prohibits quantitative restrictions on
importation between ―Member States‖ and other measures
having an ―equivalent effect,‖111 whereas Article 36 states

108. This paragraph summarizes my previous detailed analysis of the
principle of trademark exhaustion in the EU. See Calboli, supra note 2, at 47,
5359. The creation of the European internal market imposed the acceptance of
the principle of Community-wide exhaustion also with respect to patents and
copyrights. This position is different from other jurisdictions, which practice
international exhaustion with respect to trademarks, but national exhaustion
with respect to patents and copyrights.
109. Id. at 5360 (reconstructing the development of the principle of
Community-wide exhaustion and the debates over the application of this
principle as general standard among EU members). See also the ECJ position
in Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998).
110. Articles 101 and 102 (formerly 81 and 82) are the antitrust provisions of
the TFEU. See TFEU, supra note 106, arts. 101–102. The ECJ applied these
provisions in Joined Cases 56 & 58/64, Costen & Grunding v. EC Comm‘n, 1966
E.C.R. 299; Case 24/67, Parke Davis v. Centrafarm, 1968 E.C.R. 55; Case 40/70,
Sirena v. Eda, 1971 E.C.R. 69.
111. Article 34 (formerly 28) of the TFEU states that ―[q]uantitative
restriction on imports and all measures having equivalent effect shall be
prohibited between Member States.‖ TFEU, supra note 106, art. 34.

CALBOLI_FINAL

2011]

5/31/2011 5:53 PM

MARKET INTEGRATION AND FIRST SALE

1267

that domestic laws should not provide a means of ―arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction of trade between
Member States.‖112 In several decisions, the ECJ stated that
the primary purpose of trademark protection is to indicate
commercial origin and that no reason subsists to prevent the
free movement of goods carrying marks controlled by the
same companies.113 According to the ECJ, only when marks
do not share a common origin would it be possible to prevent
the importation of gray market products bearing identical or
similar marks in a member country to prevent consumer
confusion.114
While affirming the legitimacy of parallel imports of gray
market goods within the European internal market, the ECJ
conceded, however, the possibility of preventing the
importation of products, which have been altered without
trademark owners‘ consent.115 The ECJ nonetheless limited
112. Id. art. 36. Article 36 (formerly 30) states that EU members can
prohibit or restrict ―imports, exports or goods in transit‖ based upon ―public
morality, public policy or public security; the protection of health and life of
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possessing
artistic, historic or archaeological value; or the protection of industrial and
commercial property.‖ Id. These prohibitions ―shall not, however, constitute a
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between
Member States.‖ Id.
113. In Case 78/70, Deutsche Grammophon Gesellschaft mbH v. Metro-SBGrossmarket GmbH, 1971 E.C.R. 487, the ECJ distinguished between the
―existence‖ and the ―exercise‖ of intellectual property rights and stated that the
―exercise‖ should be consistent with the TFEU and protect only the ―specific
subject matter‖ of the right. The ECJ clarified the interpretation of ―specific
subject matter‖ in Case 16/74, Centrafarm BV v. Winthrop BV, 1974 E.C.R.
1183, 1194 and confirmed its view in Case 3/78, Centrafarm BV v. Am. Home
Prods. Corp., 1978 E.C.R. 183 and Case 1/81, Pfizer Inc. v. Eurim-Pharm
GmbH, 1981 E.C.R. 2913. For further analysis, see Calboli, supra note 2, at 54–
56.
114. On the principle of ―common origin,‖ see Case 192/73, Van Zuylen Freres
v. Hag AG, 1974 E.C.R. 731 (controversially stating that common origin
included the case of companies ―sharing the same origin‖ even if the marks were
not owned by the same entities); Case 119/75, Terrapin Ltd. v. Terranova
Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., 1976 E.C.R. 1039 (stating that the ―common
origin‖ doctrine was applied to a special case in Hag I); Case C-10/89, CNLSucal v. Hag AG, 1990 E.C.R. I-3711 (reversing the ECJ‘s position in Hag I);
Case C-9/93, IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH
1994 E.C.R. I-2782 (holding that the principle of ―common origin‖ does not apply
when marks have been voluntarily assigned). For further analysis on this
point, see Calboli, supra note 2, at 56–59.
115. See Case 102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v. Centrafarm
Vertriebsgesellschaft Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse mbH, 1978 E.C.R. 1139,
1164–65; see also Ansgar Only, Trade Marks and Parallel Importation—Recent
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these instances to circumstances where products had been
materially altered by the importers—for example, repackaged
or relabeled—after their first sale in the market and not to
cases where the products were genuine (originally
manufactured), and the product quality was materially
different only because of production choices or market
differentiation strategies directly originating with trademark
owners.116 Moreover, the ECJ developed the principle of
―mutual recognition‖ of product requirements to prevent
product discrimination and disguised restrictions to trade,
and ruled that member countries may not ―prohibit the sale
in [their] territory of a product lawfully produced and
marketed in another Member . . . even if the product is
produced according to technical or quality requirements
which differ from those imposed on its domestic products.‖117
As a result of this principle, differences in product
ingredients, presentation, or even technical standards would
not qualify as a legitimate reason to prevent parallel imports
and restrict free trade within the European market except in
very limited and specific circumstances.118
To prevent
disguised barriers to intra-Community trade, European
legislators also harmonized an increasing number of technical
standards. In 1985, to address the growing need for standard
harmonization, the European Council adopted the ―New
Approach to technical harmonization and standards‖119 and

Developments in European Law, 30 I.I.C. 521, 516 (1999) (providing a detailed
survey of the cases where genuine products have been repackaged, rebranded,
and relabeled).
116. Only, supra note 115, at 516–18.
117. Commission Communication, Oct. 3, 1980, Communication from the
Commission concerning the consequences of the judgment given by the Court of
Justice on 20 February 1979 in Case 120/78 (‗Cassis de Dijon‘), 1980 O.J. (C
256) 2, 2–3. The ECJ developed the principle of ―mutual recognition‖ in the
famous case Cassis de Dijon.
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649. In Cassis de
Dijon, the ECJ stated that there was no valid reason why ―provided that [the
goods] have been lawfully produced and marketed in one of the Member States,
[they] should not be introduced into any other Member State.‖ Id. at para. 14.
118. In Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ limited those instances to the measures
―being necessary to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to the
effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of
commercial transactions and the defense of the consumer.‖ Rewe-Zentral, 1979
E.C.R. 649. See also TFEU, supra note 106, art. 36.
119. Council Resolution of 7 May 1985 on a new approach to technical
harmonization and standards, 1985 O.J. (C 136) 1.
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stated that EU legislators had to indicate simply the
―essential requirements‖ for products, leaving it to
independent European Standards Organizations to develop
technical standards complying with these essential
requirements.120
The principle of Community-wide exhaustion of
trademark rights was ultimately codified in the First Council
Directive 89/104/EEC (Trademark Directive),121 and repeated
verbatim in the Council Regulation EC/40/94 (Community
Trademark Regulation).122 The adoption of the Agreement for
the European Economic Area (EEA) of May 2, 1992, extended
this principle to the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA)
countries joining the EEA (Norway, Iceland, and
Liechtenstein).123 Notably, Article 7(1) of the Directive states
that trademark rights ―shall not entitle the proprietor to
prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on
the market in the Community under that trade mark by the
proprietor or with his consent.‖124 Article 7(1) does not
explicitly say, however, that Community-wide exhaustion is
the only principle applicable within the EU (and now within
the EEA).125 In the years following the adoption of the
Directive, member countries in favor of international
exhaustion argued that this principle was simply a minimum
120. For a detailed summary of the process of harmonization of technical
standards and the ―New Approach to technical harmonization and standards,‖
see Enterprise Directorate General, Vademecum on European Standardisation,
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004) available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/polici
es/european-standards/documents/vademecum/index_en.htm.
121. Council Directive 89/104, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1 (EEC), now replaced by
European Parliament and Council Directive 2008/95, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25 (EC)
[hereinafter Trademark Directive]. For a detailed analysis of the legislative
history of the Trademark Directive and the drafting process of Article 7 on the
exhaustion of trademark rights, see Cohen Jehoram, supra note 1, at 501.
122. Council Regulation 40/94, Dec. 20, 1993 on the Community Trade Mark,
1994 O.J. (L 011) 1 (EC), now replaced by Council Regulation 207/2009, 2009
O.J. (L 78) 1 (EC) [hereinafter CTM Regulation]. Article 13(1) of the CTM
Regulation states that ―[a] Community trade mark shall not entitle the
proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put on the
market in the Community under that trade mark by the proprietor or with his
consent.‖ Id. art. 13.
123. Annex XVII and Article 2(1) of the Protocol to the Agreement on the
European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994, O.J. (L 1) 3 extended the effect of Article
7 of the Trademark Directive to the EEA from January 1, 1994.
124. Trademark Directive, supra note 121, art. 7(1).
125. See, e.g., Nicholas Shea, Does the First Trade Marks Directive Allow
International Exhaustion of Rights?, 10 E.I.P.R. 463, 463 (1995).
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standard and that individual members of the EU were free to
apply a broader rule.126 Against this position, however, the
ECJ clarified that EEA-wide exhaustion is the only applicable
criterion within the European market and that national rules
providing different exhaustion regimes needed to be
amended.127
Finally, Article 7(2) of the Trademark Directive states
that trademark rights are not exhausted where ―there exist
legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further
commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition
of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put
on the market.‖128 Although the ECJ has confirmed the
possibility that ―legitimate reasons‖ may prevent trademark
exhaustion and the free movement of goods within the EEA,
the ECJ has nonetheless interpreted this provision cautiously
to prevent unnecessary trade restrictions. Specifically, the
ECJ held that the unauthorized repackaging and relabeling
of genuine products constitute two of the few ―legitimate
reasons‖ that trademark owners may invoke to prevent
parallel trade within the EEA because they may lead to
consumer confusion or provoke unfair detriment to the
reputation of a mark.129 The ECJ also clarified that the
126. This position was strongly supported, among others, by Professor F. K.
Beier, the Director of the Max-Planck Institute for Intellectual Property,
Competition, and Tax Law. See Beier, Industrial Property, supra note 107, at
156–60. For a detailed reconstruction of the debates on this issue following the
adoption of the Trademark Directive, see Calboli, supra note 2, at 60–66.
127. See Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998). In Silhouette, the ECJ explicitly
stated that ―[n]ational rules providing for exhaustion of trade-mark rights in
respect of products put on the market outside the EEA under that mark by the
proprietor or with its consent are contrary to Article 7(1).‖ Id. at para 31. The
ECJ confirmed this position in C-173/98, Sebago Inc. and Ancienne Maison
Dubois et Fils AS v. GB-Unic SA, (1999) C.M.L.R. 1317; Joined Cases C-414416/99, Zino Davidoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd, Levi Strauss & Co. v. Tesco
Stores Ltd., and Levi Strauss & Co. v. Costco Wholesale UK Ltd., 2001 E.C.R. I8691; C-324/08, Makro Zelfbedieningsgroothandel CV, Metro Cash & Carry BV,
Remo Zaandam BV v. Diesel SpA, 2009 E.C.R. I-10019. But see Case C-306/96,
Javico Int‘l & Javico AG v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfums SA, 1998 E.C.R. I-1983
(where the ECJ adopted a different position based upon the antitrust provisions
of the TFEU); Mag Instrument Inc. v. California Trading Co., 29 I.I.C. 316
(EFTA 1998) (where the EFTA court stressed that courts or legislators in EFTA
States should decide on the admissibility of products imported from outside the
EEA).
128. Trademark Directive, supra note 121, art. 7(2).
129. See Joined Cases C-427, C-429 & C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v.
Paranova A/S, 1996 E.C.R. I-3457, I-3536–45; Case C-379/97, Pharmacia &
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exceptions of Article 7(2) do not extend to genuine goods of
materially different quality when these differences are the
result of trademark owners‘ marketing strategies and the
unauthorized importers have not modified the products.130
Likewise, the principle of mutual recognition continues to
apply in the EU (EEA), and EU (EEA) members cannot
prevent the importation of materially different goods from
other members when those products comply with the
requirements of the exporting countries.131 Moreover, a ―New
Legislative Framework‖ has replaced the ―New Approach to
technical harmonization‖ and requires that EU (EEA)
members take on an even larger role in increasing compliance
with European standards to promote product uniformity and
intra-EEA trade.132
IV. LESSONS FROM A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF NORTH
AMERICA AND EUROPE
This Section compares the positions adopted by NAFTA
Upjohn SA v. Paranova A/S, 1999 E.C.R. I-6927; Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v.
Ballantine & Son Ltd., 1997 E.C.R. I-6227; Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian
Dior SA v. Evora BV, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013; Case C-143/00, Boehringer Ingelheim
KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2002 E.C.R. I-3759; Case C-348/04, Boehringer
Ingelheim KG v. Swingward Ltd., 2007 E.C.R. I-03391; Case C- 276/05,
Wellcome Found. Ltd. v. Paranova Parmazeutika Handels GmbH, 2008 E.C.R.
I-10479; see also Irini A. Stamatoudi & Paul L.C. Torremans, International
Exhaustion in the European Union in the Light of “Zino Davidoff”: Contract
Versus Trade Mark Law?, 31 I.I.C. 123, 137–38 (2000); Paul Torremans, New
Repackaging Under the Trade Mark Directive of Well-established Exhaustion
Principles, 11 E.I.P.R. 664 (1997). But see Case C-59/08, Copad SA v. Christian
Dior Couture SA and Others, 2009 E.C.R. I-3421; Case C-558/08, Portakabin
Ltd., Portakabin BV v. Primakabin BV, 2010 E.C.R. I-0000; Case C-127/09, Coty
Prestige Lancaster Group GmbH v. Simex Trading AG, 2010 E.C.R. I-0000.
130. In Loendersloot, 1997 E.C.R. I-6227, the ECJ also said that importers
could remove labels when these labels had been placed by trademark owners
simply to control distribution and prevent parallel imports. In Parfums
Christian Dior, 1997 E.C.R. I-6013, the ECJ went even further and applied
trademark exhaustion to the use of trademarks in advertising. More recently,
however, in Copad, 2009 E.C.R. I-3421 the ECJ stated that a trademark owner
may oppose the unauthorized sale of luxury goods to discount stores by a
licensee if the sale could damages the reputation of the mark.
131. See Council Resolution of 28 October 1999 on mutual recognition, 2000
O.J. (C 141) 2 (incorporated into the EEA Agreement); see Decision of the EEA
Joint Committee No. 15/2002 of 1 March 2002 amending Annex II (technical
regulations, standards, testing, and certifications) to the EEA Agreement, 2002
O.J. (L 110) 9.
132. European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No. 765/2008 of 9
July 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 218) 30.
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and EU (EEA) members, and emphasizes the limitations of
the principle of trademark first sale to guarantee free trade in
free trade areas. In particular, this Section argues that
effective free trade in free trade areas requires the adoption
of a cumulative approach that combines uniform first sale
rules, of at least regional exhaustion, with the prohibition
against preventing the importation of materially different
gray market products. This Section concludes that, in the
long term, this can be achieved by the international
harmonization of national product standards.
In the
immediate future, however, members of free trade areas can
admit materially different gray market goods based on one of
the following approaches: (1) mutually recognize national
product characteristics of other members of free trade areas,
or (2) allow the importation of materially different goods, so
long as those products are properly labeled to avoid consumer
confusion.
A. Trademark First Sale and Market Integration in North
America and Europe
As elaborated in Part II, the general purpose of the
principle of trademark first sale is to prevent the use of
marks as a tool for market segmentation and to promote the
free movement of goods in the market.133 The application of
this principle across multiple jurisdictions, however, has
created heated debate because of the impact of parallel
imports on corporate profits and, in turn, national
economies.134
Still, countries have intensely pursued
international free trade agreements in the past few decades
because of their advantages for both corporations and
national economies.135 Hence, effective free trade can be
secured only by limiting, inter alia, the domestic enforcement
of national trademark rights when this enforcement can
represent a barrier to legitimate trade.136
The above described approaches by NAFTA and EU
(EEA) members regarding the admissibility of gray market
133. See discussion supra Part II.
134. See discussion supra Part I.
135. Id.
136. See generally ABBOT ET AL., supra note 4, at 1 (introducing the relevance
of international intellectual property in an increasingly integrated world
economy).
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goods in their territory directly reflect this tension between
free trade and the exercise of trademark rights.137 NAFTA
and EU (EEA) members, however, have followed different
models when pursuing the creation of their respective free
trade areas.138 Similar to TRIPS, NAFTA members have
adopted primarily a laissez faire approach to domestic
trademark first sale rules based on a strict interpretation of
the principle of trademark territoriality and national
sovereignty.139
In contrast, EU (EEA) members have
partially relinquished national sovereignty on the matter,
and have harmonized their national laws to create a unified
European market where the free movement of goods is a
fundamental priority.140
Still, despite the fact that the harmonization of domestic
rules on trademark first sale never constituted a national
priority among NAFTA members,141 all members of NAFTA
individually practice international trademark exhaustion and
permit the importation, and the circulation, of gray market
goods within their respective territory when the marks
affixed to the products share a common origin inside and
outside their jurisdictions.142 As a result, NAFTA members
de facto promote the free movement of goods across the
NAFTA territory.143 NAFTA does not create, however, a fully
137. Id.
138. See discussion supra Part III.
139. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an
Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INT‘L L. 505, 549 n.223 (1997) (highlighting that
NAFTA members only agreed upon the fact that NAFTA requires them to
maintain the minimum standards described in the agreement); James A.R.
Nafziger, NAFTA’s Regime for Intellectual Property: In the Mainstream of Public
International Law, 19 HOUS. J. INT‘L L. 807, 815–16 (1997) (stressing that
NAFTA members diverge on details regarding trademarks); see also NAFTA,
supra note 19, art. 1701 (indicating that members must adhere to the standards
set forth in NAFTA, but may create their own trademark registration systems).
140. See discussion supra Part III.B.
141. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in
the Americas: A Work in Progress, 14 NW. J. INT‘L. L. & BUS. 493, 493–96 (1994)
(discussing the 1990 initiation of NAFTA negotiations between the United
States and Mexico); Richard Bernal, Regional Trade Arrangements in the
Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 683, 697 (1993) (discussing
the proposal of NAFTA in the 1990s); Frank J. Garcia, Protection of Intellectual
Property Rights in the North American Free Trade Agreement: A Successful Case
of Regional Trade Regulation, 8 AM. U. J. INT‘L L. & POL‘Y 817, 821 (1993)
(noting Mexico‘s desire to be a part of the NAFTA).
142. See discussion supra Part III.A.
143. Id.

CALBOLI_FINAL

1274

5/31/2011 5:53 PM

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:51

integrated market because material differences in product
quality can theoretically operate as a barrier to intra-NAFTA
trade and ultimately undermine the scope of national rules on
international trademark first sale.144
Moreover, the
harmonization of technical standards across NAFTA
members only partially eliminates barriers to intra-NAFTA
trade, such as existing differences in product standards or
requirements.145 NAFTA members also do not adopt a
principle of mutual recognition as extensive as the principle
developed by the ECJ and implemented in the EU (EEA).146
Nevertheless, although still at the national level, all NAFTA
members adopt domestic policies to reduce the impact of the
materially different quality argument on international
imports.147
Specifically, appropriate labeling can cure
material product differences and allow the importation of
qualitatively different gray market goods into the Canadian
and the U.S. markets while Mexican law does not seem to
prevent the admissibility into Mexico of any products, also
materially different, as long as the importers have not altered
the products.148 Furthermore, NAFTA members do not create
a ―fortress NAFTA‖ against parallel imports from outside
their free trade area and apply the principle of international
exhaustion to all products worldwide.149 Still, the strong
144. For a similar conclusion, see Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 329 (comparing
the NAFTA and EU trading blocks).
145. See NAFTA, supra note 19, Ch. 7B on sanitary and phytosanitary
measures (SPS), and Ch. 9 on technical barriers to trade (TBT). See also
Maureen Irish, Regulatory Convergence, Security and Global Administrative
Law in Canada-United States Trade, 12 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 333, 339 (2009)
(providing a detailed analysis of these and other provisions related to NAFTA
SPS and TBT measures).
146. See NAFTA, supra note 19, art. 714; see also Irish, supra note 145, at
339–40. ―Both SPS and TBT provisions in NAFTA contain explicit obligations
to recognize measures of other NAFTA Parties as equivalent.‖ Id. at 339.
―Neither go as far as the Cassis de Dijon decision . . . which interprets the ban
on measures equivalent to quantitative restrictions . . . as requiring that any
products lawfully produced or marketed in the Community must also have free
access to the rest of the Community unless they would harm legitimate
interests in the importing state . . . .‖ Id. at 339 n.28. For a position in favor of
creating a full NAFTA common market, see WENDY DOBSON, C.D. HOWE
INSTITUTE, THE BORDER PAPERS, NO. 162, SHAPING THE FUTURE OF THE NORTH
AMERICAN ECONOMIC SPACE: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION (Toronto 2002),
available at http://www.cdhowe.org/pdf/commentary_162.pdf.
147. See discussion supra Part III.A.
148. Id.
149. Gonzalez, supra note 78, at 330.
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reliance on national rules by NAFTA members continues to
characterize NAFTA as a fragile market integrated area,
where national interest could easily prevail upon the
principle of free movement of goods across NAFTA members
and undermine the very purpose of the free trade area.
By contrast, the process of market integration in the
European Union led EU (EEA) members to necessarily
abandon their individual national policies and to harmonize
national laws with respect to trademark exhaustion as well
as technical standards to remove any disguised barriers to
effective European trade.150 EEA-wide trademark exhaustion
has thus become the rule applicable to all EU (EEA)
members.151 To fill any remaining gap and avoid disguised
restrictions to the free movement of goods in the EU (EEA),
the ECJ developed the principle of mutual recognition and
repeatedly ruled that products should be allowed in the
market of any EU (EEA) country if they comply with the
standards of the country where they were first marketed.152
Only very serious concerns relating to health, security, or
public policy in member countries can supersede this
principle and prevent intra-EEA trade.153 As a result,
products can freely circulate within the European market
without any barriers, even when they are materially different
in quality.154 Nevertheless, this integration does not extend
beyond the territory of EEA members; goods are free to move
within the EEA but genuine products coming from outside
―fortress Europe‖ can be legally stopped at the will of
trademark owners.155 Ultimately, this solution reduces the
scope of trademark exhaustion exclusively to European trade
and permits market partitioning outside the EEA by the
same multinational corporations that distribute goods under
the principle of regional exhaustion within EU (EEA)
150. See discussion supra Part III.B.
151. See Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998).
152. Id.
153. See TFEU, supra note 106, art. 36; Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v.
Bundesmonopolverwaltung fur Branntwein, 1979 E.C.R. 649.
154. See discussion supra Part III.B.
155. See, e.g., Carl Steele, “Fortresse Europe” for Trademark Owners, 1998
TRADEMARK WORLD 14 (Aug. 1998) (summarizing the relevance of the ECJ‘s
decision in Silhouette in creating a closed trading block among member
countries).
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members.156 At the regional level, however, the EU (EEA)
solution constitutes a stronger and more definite approach
than NAFTA to facilitate trade among members of a free
trade area, although merely at the EU (EEA) level.
B. The Successful Recipe for Market Integration Beyond
Trademark First Sale
In light of the above, the following considerations can
thus be derived with respect to the relationship between the
exercise of trademark rights, free trade, and the principle of
trademark first sale to promote effective market integration
and the free movements of goods within the territory of free
trade areas.
Generally, the comparative analysis of NAFTA and the
EU directly demonstrates that effective free movement of
goods in free trade areas cannot be achieved by relying
exclusively on the principle of trademark first sale, even if
countries nominally adopt national rules of international or
regional trademark exhaustion.
As this Article has
highlighted, material product differences can jeopardize free
trade in free trade areas when countries prevent the
importation of gray market products because of these
material quality differences. The adoption of uniform rules
on either international or regional trademark first sale still
remains, however, the primary condition that is necessary for
creating an effective system of free movement of products
across members of free trade areas.157
In contrast, if
members of free trade areas adopt domestic rules in favor
only of national exhaustion, or practice non-uniform regimes
of international and regional exhaustion, this would result in
preventing regional trade altogether.
In particular, if
members of a free trade area practice only national
trademark exhaustion, this would necessarily prevent any
parallel trade among members. Similarly, if they adopt nonuniform exhaustion regimes, the goods lawfully imported
from outside the free trade area into the territory of the
156. Critically, on this aspect of the principle of the EEA-wide exhaustion,
see Calboli, supra note 2, at 87–90.
157. See Case C-335/96, Silhouette International Schmied v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft, 30 I.I.C. 920 (1998).
―This, moreover, is the only
interpretation which is fully capable of . . . safeguard[ing] the functioning of the
internal market.‖ Id. at para. 27.
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members practicing international trademark exhaustion
would not be allowed into members practicing regional
exhaustion, which would in turn jeopardize free trade within
the whole free trade area.158 As this Article has illustrated,
both NAFTA and the EU adopt uniform national positions—
international and EEA-wide exhaustion for NAFTA and EU
(EEA) members, respectively.159 Hence, the problem of nonuniform national rules was precisely at the heart of the
discussions that ultimately led the ECJ to clarify that EEAwide exhaustion is the only applicable rule for all members,
even for those previously practicing international
exhaustion.160
Beyond requiring the adoption of uniform rules on
trademark first sale, the comparison of NAFTA and the EU
indicates, however, that effective market integration in free
trade areas also requires the elimination of other barriers to
trade so as to permit the parallel trade of all genuine
products across members, even when those products carry
differences in their material quality.161 Generally, one of the
primary objectives under international trade law and policy—
the harmonization, or at least the approximation, of national
product standards—can eventually eliminate these barriers
and facilitate free trade.162 Undoubtedly, the adoption of
uniform standards would diminish the need for
manufacturers to adapt their products to different national
markets and it would impose compliance with certain
common product standards across different jurisdictions.163
Still, this harmonization would be a lengthy process that also
requires compromises and changes in national standards,
which in turn can increase the opposition against free trade
and free trade agreements at the national level.164
Furthermore, the harmonization of national standards will
158. See Calboli, supra note 2, at 60–66.
159. See discussion supra Part III.A–B.
160. See discussion supra Part III.B.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Lori M. Wallach, Accountable Governance in the Era of
Globalization: The WTO, NAFTA, and International Harmonization of
Standards, 50 U. KAN. L. REV. 823, 823 (2002).
163. Id. at 824.
164. See id. at 823–24 (arguing in this context with respect to NAFTA and
the WTO that ―decades of popular political movements . . . have struggled to
ensure that those who will live with the results are able to control the process
and outcomes of important policy decisions‖).
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not eliminate all product differences across separate
jurisdictions. Trademark owners do not differentiate their
goods merely to satisfy different national standards. As
mentioned earlier, they often adapt products to domestic
preferences and tastes, or simply use different ingredients
based on local competition or basic costs.165 These differences
will continue to exist even in the ideal (and remote) situation
where national requirements are fully harmonized, and
trademark owners will continue to use these differences to try
to prevent unauthorized channeling of their products across
separate countries, and to segment the international market
altogether.166
Ultimately, the comparative analysis of NAFTA and the
EU demonstrates that effective market integration among
members of free trade areas may be achieved only if,
alongside the process of harmonization of national product
standards, members adopt at least one of the following
approaches. First, as exemplified by the position taken in the
EU (EEA), members of free trade areas can promote free
trade in their areas by implementing national principles of
mutual recognition and by accepting into their territory gray
market goods from other members as long as these goods
comply with the product requirements of their country of
origin.167 Unlike the harmonization of national standards,
the mutual recognition of the quality of goods coming from
other members of free trade areas does not require changes in
national standards. In contrast, mutual recognition only
165. It is generally known, for example, that the traditional Coca-Cola
beverage made in Mexico is different from the same beverage distributed in the
U.S. market. See Louise Chu, Is The Mexican Coke the Real Thing?, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIBUNE, Nov. 9, 2004, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/unio
ntrib/20041109/news_1b9mexcoke.html.
The Mexican Coca-Cola soda is made with sugar cane sweetener. Id. In
the United States, the Coca-Cola Company stopped using cane sugar in the
1980s because of rising cost and started using corn syrup instead. Id. Still,
numerous American consumers prefer the Mexican version of the Coca-Cola
beverage over the U.S. version because of the sweeter taste and intentionally
purchase the Mexican Coca-Cola precisely because of its material different
quality when they see the Mexican products on the shelves of U.S. stores. Id.
On the differences between Mexican and U.S. Coca-Cola and the reaction of
U.S. consumers, see id.
166. See id.
167. Joel P. Trachtman, Toward Open Recognition? Standardization and
Regional Integration Under Article XXIV of GATT, 6 J. INT‘L ECON. L. 459
(2003).
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requires the acceptance of the importation of those goods,
even though they may be of materially different quality than
the products distributed nationally, so long as they comply
with fundamental national requirements, such as national
security, safety, and public health related standards.168 The
acceptance of this principle, however, may prove controversial
within national jurisdictions because it treats imported goods
differently from the products distributed nationally.169 As
some authors have noted, this principle may even conflict
with the non-discrimination and most-favored-nation
principles that all WTO members are supposed to follow as
part of their GATT, WTO, and TRIPS obligations.170
Accordingly, although undoubtedly useful to promote free
trade at the regional level, this solution seems less preferred
for members of free trade areas.
Second, perhaps less controversial and immediately more
effective is the approach of allowing the importation of
qualitatively different gray market products into the
territories of members of free trade areas so long as the
products are properly labeled by the importers and comply
with the fundamental requirements of national security,
safety, and public health. Under this approach, which is
currently applied by Canada and the United States, third
party unauthorized importers of materially different gray
market products are required to specify the different

168. See discussion supra Part III.B.
169. See generally Irish, supra note 145, at 350 (stating that ―[f]or [mutual
recognition] to work effectively, regulators from the involved countries must
trust each other and accept that they have obligations extending beyond
responsibilities to their own citizenries‖). The tension between mutual
recognition and national standards ―is especially significant for mutual
recognition of conformity assessments in which testing, inspection, verification
or monitoring of compliance is done in one country and recognized in others.‖
Id.
170. Because of its limited scope, this Article does not provide an exhaustive
analysis of the tension between the principle of mutual recognition and the
principle of non-discrimination, most-favored nation, and national treatment
under GATT, the WTO, and TRIPS. Generally, it has been affirmed that the
EU principle of mutual recognition is compatible with GATT and WTO
principles, although some doubts in this respect have been raised during the
recent enlargement of the EU. On these important aspects, see Lorand Bartels,
The Legality of the EC Mutual Recognition Clause Under WTO Law, 8 J. INT‘L.
ECON. L. 691 (2005); Kalypso Nicolaidis, Non-Discriminatory Mutual
Recognition: An Oxymoron in the New WTO Lexicon?, in REGULATORY BARRIERS
AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW 267 (2000).
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characteristics of the products and disclaim that their
distribution is not authorized by trademark owners.171 By
using appropriate labels, unauthorized importers can thus
easily dispel any likelihood of consumer confusion as to the
quality of the imported products and prevent any alleged
harm that the public could suffer because of the sale of these
unauthorized gray market goods.172 Notably, these labels
allow consumers to clearly identify the differences among the
products offered for sale, respectively, by trademark owners
and by unauthorized importers under the same mark in the
same national markets. Consumers can then base their
purchases on an informed judgment about these respective
products and their different qualities.173 As stressed before,
despite trademark owners‘ opposition to parallel imports, the
sale of genuine products outside authorized channels of
distribution do not alter or modify products per se—products
remain in the same form as when the trademark owners
originally distributed them, even if in a foreign market.174
These sales also do not cause detriment to the traditional
functions of the marks because the marks continue to indicate
to consumers the commercial origin and the quality of the
products as if they were distributed by trademark owners. 175
Although less controversial and immediately more effective,
this solution remains nevertheless imperfect. In a completely
integrated market, as currently in the EU (EEA), materially
different genuine products should be able to move regardless
of ad hoc labels disclosing their differences. Still, this
solution clearly represents the easier solution, to date, to
171. See discussion supra Part III.A.
172. In Canada, see Consumers Distributing Co. Ltd. v. Seiko Time Canada
Ltd. (1984), 1 C.P.R. 3d 1, 13–14 (Can. S.C.C.); Nestle Enterprises Ltd. v. Edan
Sales Inc. (1991), 37 C.P.R. 3d 480 (Can. F.C.A.). In the United States, see
MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50.
173. See Chu, supra note 165. ―While the flavor of Mexican Coke provides a
taste of nostalgia for immigrants hundreds of miles from home, its retro greentinted contour glass bottles have also caught on among some baby boomers, who
can recall a time when their cola was made with sugar.‖ Id. ―Coca-Cola
downplays the appeal of the cane sugar version, insisting that ‗there‘s not a
perceivable taste difference between Mexican Coke and Coke bottled in the
U.S.‘ . . . [b]ut fans of the import claim there‘s a world of a difference.‖ Id. ―Rob
Boyce . . . discovered the drink while living for a time in Yuma, Ariz. . . . Now
back in Georgia, Boyce savors the few Mexican Cokes that he comes across,
sipping carefully rather than guzzling what he considers a treat.‖ Id.
174. See MCCARTHY, supra note 10, § 29:50.50.
175. Id.
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achieve effective market integration in free trade areas
compatible with the principles of trademark territoriality and
national sovereignty.
In summary, although fiercely opposed by multinational
corporations because of the additional pressure that gray
market goods create for their business, ―the territorial
approach of trademark law and the interests of international
trade do not form irreconcilable contradictions.‖176 As this
Article has reiterated, trademark rights do not permit
trademark owners to control the distribution of products after
their first sale in the market.177 To grant this control to
trademark owners would create an unjustified monopoly
against the rights of purchasers to dispose of their lawfully
acquired products and resell them as they see convenient.
Accordingly, when national interests prompt individual
countries to enter free trade agreements to take advantage of
the benefits of free trade, this principle needs to extend to the
whole territory of the regional block of countries that are
members of these agreements. Consequently, the national
exercise of trademark rights should not interfere with the free
movement of goods across this territory so long as products
are genuine and importers have not altered their quality.
Likewise, multinational corporations should not object to the
free movement of genuine products across this territory by
relying on (often minimal) differences in the quality of their
products, particularly when labels or other notices can
properly inform consumers about these product differences.
To the contrary, the proper functioning of free trade in free
trade areas would be jeopardized and trademark protection
would wrongfully exceed its scope to the detriment of
competition and consumers.178
V. CONCLUSION
The relationship between international trade and
trademark rights is a complex one. Despite trademark
owners‘ desires to control the future distribution of the
products that they have introduced into the market,
trademark law was never intended to grant trademark
176. Beier, supra note 1, at 71.
177. See discussion supra Part II.A.
178. Beier, supra note 1, at 71–72.
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owners this control. Although generally accepted at the
national level, this principle has been fiercely debated
internationally due to the strong interests of multinational
corporations in preventing arbitrage in consumer goods from
low-cost to high-cost countries and maximizing profits across
separate jurisdictions. Hence, free trade is a fundamental
component of the modern economy and the free movement of
goods is a fundamental component of free trade, which
requires the limitation of the exercise of national trademark
rights when these rights act as barriers to free trade.
Different trade areas in the world have adopted different
solutions with respect to the application of the principle of
trademark first sale, or trademark exhaustion, to promote
regional market integration. The analysis of the market
integration achieved, respectively, by NAFTA and EU (EEA)
members indicates that regional market integration requires,
at a minimum, the adoption of uniform national rules
providing for the exhaustion of trademark rights
internationally or, at least, within the territory of members of
a free trade area. Effective integration in free trade areas
may be jeopardized, however, when material differences in
product quality operate as barriers to trade among members,
even if members uniformly practice international or regional
trademark exhaustion. The harmonization, or at least the
approximation, of national standards alongside the mutual
recognition of product characteristics, or the acceptance into
national markets of materially different gray market products
from other members with appropriate labels disclosing these
differences, can nevertheless overcome these barriers.
Ultimately, to invoke trademark protection to segment the
market against the parallel trade of genuine goods across
members not only undermines the purpose of free trade
areas; it also goes against the general scope of trademark
protection, which protects consumers against confusion and
trademark owners against illegitimate actions that could take
unfair advantage of, or damage, the reputation of the marks,
and does not prohibit the resale of genuine goods that
trademark owners themselves have introduced into the
market, even if in the territory of another member of a free
trade area.

